In recent years, the GAM remained focused on the establishment of an independent Islamic kingdom in the province of Aceh. Although funding and equipment had been reportedly sent to the GAM from Iran and Libya, the group did not hold the anti-U.S. sentiment of the worldwide Islamist movement, and its leader, Hasan di Tiro, has even expressed support for the U.S. war on terror and claimed to actively seek American support. Talks with the Indonesian government began in 2000, mediated by the Henry Durant Center in Switzerland, resulting in a number of cease-fires that did not hold. Jakarta stressed that special autonomy would be the goal of any negotiation, while the GAM held out hope for a referendum on independence  --  a critical rift responsible for the lack of real political progress. <P><br />Negotiations with Jakarta ultimately caused a split in the GAM, a situation widely unknown in the Western press. Hasan di Tiro, the group's founder living in exile in Sweden, led a faction that rejected any compromise with the Indonesian government, calling itself the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ANSLF). The rival faction, involved in the negotiations in Switzerland, was called the Free Aceh Movement Government Council (MP-GAM). Its leader, Teungku Don Zulfari, is based out of Malaysia. There was also internal complication in Jakarta regarding policy toward the GAM, in which the TNI, suspicious of talks, favored using overwhelming military force to deal with the group. This stance led the TNI to place political pressure on the government for the imposition of martial law in Aceh. <P><br />U.S. policy toward the GAM has been influenced by the conflict in East Timor and the current war on terror. Eager to restore links with the Indonesian military after 1999, the U.S. pressured the GAM into accepting a political settlement based on autonomy within Indonesia, assuring Jakarta that it supported Indonesian territorial integrity. Realizing the crucial role that Indonesia can play in the war on terror, Washington supported counter-terrorism training for the TNI while continuing to pressure the GAM. Although the U.S. never singled out the TNI for its human rights record in Aceh, it lobbied against the TNI's request for imposition of martial law. <P><br />As of summer 2005, the GAM continued its struggle. Attacks remained focused on Indonesian security personnel; however the group also targeted civilians both directly and indirectly. The GAM caused civilian casualties in its attacks on Indonesian police and military targets while also directly targeting civilian groups and infrastructure opposed to its activities. However, the tsunami disaster of 2004 would ultimately bring the GAM and the government back to the negotiating table. <P><br />In August 2005, the GAM and the Indonesian government signed a comprehensive peace accord. The deal called for the GAM to disarm, and for Aceh to be granted a form of local self-governance. Although this was not the full independence that GAM desired, all non-local TNI were to leave Aceh, and all GAM fighters would be granted amnesty.  In December 2005, the GAM officially disarmed, and the TNI left Aceh as agreed.  Although the group is officially inactive, peace deals have been broken before in Aceh, and only time will tell if the current agreement will hold up and end hostilities. <br /><br />